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Abstract:
In a common market with costless mobility of all factors, regional governments can attract mo-
bile rms by granting subsidies which must be nanced out of wage taxes on mobile labour.
Since rms locate where subsidies are highest and workers settle where taxes are lowest, gov-
ernment are forced "in the splits" (double Bertrand-type tax competition). We assume that
without government intervention there is unemployment in the economy. Then regional gov-
ernments behave like middlemen in the (distorted) labour market and the scal game takes the
form of competition among strategic intermediaries. Results from the theory of intermediation
are applied to this framework, enabling us to explain why government size may increase rather
than decline under the the pressures of ongoing economic integration, how industrial clustering
may emerge from tax competition, or how unemployment can be turned into job vacancies.
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Nontechnical Summary
Tax competition may be an ospring of the combat against unemployment: Governments
typically want to help their economies prosper, and with unemployment galore many believe
that actively attracting investment by providing subsidies or preferential tax treatment is a
good means to this end. When they luckily lured an investor to their region, politicians can
proudly point to the jobs they successfully "created" and which, in their interpretation, would
have been lost to other regions had they not fought so bravely in a tax competition game or a
bidding war. However, largesse to mobile investors requires a deep hand in somebody's pockets.
In the absence of intergovernmental funds sharing, all infrastructure expenditures, subsidies, tax
breaks, etc. have to be nanced out of the budget of the government that grants them { hence
out of revenues from other tax bases.
The tax bases supposed to foot the bill for attractive packages to mobile investors can them-
selves be mobile or immobile { which makes up for crucial dierences in the strategic incentives
of governments in a scal game. E.g., assume that governments have to nance their expen-
ditures by a tax on labour income. If labour is immobile, then it makes a rather inelastic tax
base that governments can easily resort to. This is the case most often discussed in the tax
competition literature. If, however, the labour tax base is itself mobile between regions and
workers will choose their residence as to avoid high taxes, governments face a trickier task: To
attract investors they have to provide subsidies at a suciently generous level. The costs have to
be covered from taxes on mobile workers who will only want to settle in a region where taxation
is suciently low. This forces governments in the splits: They are required to nance generous
expenditures out of low taxes.
To get a job, workers must settle where rms are located, i.e. where subsidies are high. High
subsidies necessitate, however, high taxes to be levied on workers. Workers thus are nancing
their own jobs { by the intermediation of governments. Governments act as middlemen in the
labour market: They "buy jobs" when rewarding rms which locate in their region with a sub-
sidy, and they "re-sell the jobs" when charging income taxes to workers which serve to cover
the governments' budgetary needs. Since only employed workers pay taxes and the number of
employed workers in a region is limited by the number of jobs created there, rationing may
possibly occur in the labour market. This prevents that doing the splits may end too painful
for governments.
We assume that governments are Leviathans, aiming at maximizing their budget surplusses.
Furthermore, tax competition is of a double Bertrand, winner-take-all type: Firms locate where
subsidies are most generous, giving governments the incentive to slightly overbid the highest of
the other governments' subsidies. Workers choose their residence among those "industrialized"
regions where taxation is lowest, giving governments the incentive to slightly undercut the other
governments' tax rates.
Formally similar problems occur in the eld of (nancial) intermediation, e.g. when banks
compete both for loans (by demanding low interest rates from borrowers) and deposits (by of-
fering high interest rates to lenders). Given these structural similarities, we can { with minor
modications { transfer approaches and results from this strand of economic research to the
eld of interregional competition.
We start from a situation with unemployment, generated by too high nominal wages. Subsi-
dies to rms boast labour demand, and wage taxes reduce workers' incentives to supply labour.
A Nash equilibrium of a scal game in such a setting has the following properties:
 Unemployment will never occur. Oddly enough, there even may be job vacancies.
 All Leviathan governments run a balanced budget (zero budget surplusses).
 The budget volume is huge: wage tax revenues climb to the top region of their Laer curve
(if not to its peak). Unlike in standard scal games, government size does not shrink due
to tax competition, but rather explodes.
 Tax competition may be regarded as a giant redistribution scheme from workers to rms.
 Although all regions are identical, there may be an extreme concentration of all rms (and
workers) in one region.
1 Introduction
Tax competition may be the o-spring of governments' ght against high unemployment. Gov-
ernments typically want to help their economies prosper, and with unemployment galore many
believe that actively attracting investment by providing subsidies or preferential tax treatment
is a good means to this end. If in an integrated economy they luckily lured an investor to their
jurisdiction, politicians can proudly point to the jobs they successfully "created" and which, in
their interpretation, would have been lost to other regions had they not fought so bravely against
their competitors from other jurisdictions. The strive to attract businesses not too seldom takes
the form of tax competition games and veritable bidding wars.
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Fiscal games of this type are
played among national governments as well as, on the subnational level, between regional or
local ones.
In any case, oering fat bribes is not without cost, and largesse to mobile investors usually re-
quires a deep hand in some taxpayers' pockets. Ignoring the intricacies of tax incidence, any tax
cut for companies and any tax-nanced subsidization of rms eectively involves a redistribution
from some other taxpayers to capital owners, for whom the subsidies or special tax treatments
represent pure gains. In the absence of intergovernmental funds sharing, all infrastructure ex-
penditures, subsidies, tax breaks, tax rebates etc. have to be nanced out of the budget of the
government that grants them { and hence out of its own revenues from other tax bases.
The tax bases supposed to foot the bill for attractive tax and subsidy packages for mobile
investors can themselves be mobile or immobile { which makes up for a crucial dierence in the
strategic incentives for governments when entering into a scal game. Assume, e.g., that there
is only one such tax base available, say labour income:
 If, as it is commonly assumed in tax competition models, workers are immobile between
jurisdictions, their incomes oer a rather inelastic tax base which governments can resort
to when competing for investment. As a result, one nds both a high tax burden on
immobile tax bases and a high subsidization of (or a low tax burden on) mobile tax issues
(see, among many others, Bucovetsky/Wilson 1991). The shift of the tax burden from
internationally mobile capital to more immobile labour and consumption which can be
observed in all industrialized countries over the last 15 years is sometimes regarded as
anecdotal evidence of this result.
 If, however, workers are also mobile between jurisdictions and choose their residence such
as to avoid high tax burdens, governments face a trickier task: To attract investors they
1
Notable examples are listed in Black/Hoyt (1989), Haaparanta (1996), and in The Economist (issue of
Feb. 1, 1997, p. 25). For a comprehensive discussion of the role of subsidies to private rms in federal systems see
Mueller (1997).
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have to provide suciently generous subsidies or preferential tax treatment the costs of
which have to be covered from taxes on mobile households. Taxpayers, however, will only
want to live in a jurisdiction when (i) there are enough jobs (say, when subsidies are high
enough to make rms settle there), and when (ii) tax rates are suciently low. Obviously,
this forces governments "in the splits": They are required to nance generous expenditures
out of low taxes.
In this paper we present such a model of tax competition among governments "in the splits":
Governments lure mobile investors by high subsidies and mobile households by job opportunities
and low income taxes. We use "subsidy" as a generic term for any measure that is to the benet
of investors and that is { relative to an unmodelled initial state { costly for the government
budget; this notion includes preferential tax treatment. Similarly, "income tax" means any
labour-supply related levy on households that governments can use to raise revenues.
Under closer scrutiny, the problem of governments "in the splits" is not as paradox as we have
just put it. When generous subsidies to would-be investors are nanced out of residence based
taxes on labour income, then, in a sense, workers may be seen as nancing their own jobs {
by the unwarranted intermediation of governments. If both rms and workers are mobile, then
governments act like middlemen: their tax policies determine the matching of labour demands
and supplies. Governments "buy jobs" when rewarding rms which locate in their jurisdiction
with a subsidy, and they "re-sell the jobs" when charging an income tax to workers. Of course,
only employed workers are subject to the income tax and the number of employed workers in
a jurisdiction is limited by the number of jobs created there. It is this potential rationing in
the labour market which prevents that doing the splits may end too painful for governments.
However, the strategic considerations involved in choosing a tax-subsidy scheme are not trivial.
Assume that governments aim at maximizing their budget surplusses (tax revenues minus sub-
sidy payouts) and that tax competition is of the extreme Bertrand, winner-take-all type: Firms
locate where subsidies are most generous, giving governments the incentive to slightly overbid
the highest of the other governments' subsidies. Workers choose their residence among those
"industrialized" regions which impose the lightest tax burden, giving governments the incentive
to slightly undercut the lowest of the other governments' tax rates.
Formally similar problems as the one just described occur in the eld of intermediation, e.g.,
when banks compete both for loans (by demanding low interest rates from borrowers) and de-
posits (by oering high interest rates to lenders). Recently, this type of competition among
middlemen has received some attention in the theory of (nancial) intermediation (see, e.g.,
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Stahl 1988 or Yanelle 1988, 1989, 1996, 1997). A major question of this research
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is whether
a large number of intermediaries can replace the rather obscure gure of the Walrasian auc-
tioneer common in competitive equilibrium theory. Although this is far from our theme, we
can { with minor modications { transfer approaches and results from this strand of economic
research to the eld of scal competition.
Tax competition is often viewed as a taming device for Leviathan governments (e.g. Sinn 1992
or, sceptically, Edwards/Keen 1996). The mobility of tax bases is hoped to reduce the gov-
ernments' capability of exploiting them. Downward pressures on budget sizes and tax rates are
perceived to be especially strong when tax competition is of the winner-take-all, Bertrand type.
This reects the fear of a "race to the bottom", often expressed in political debates on tax com-
petition (see e.g. OECD 1998). In our framework, where tax competition is of a double Bertrand
type, results are very much in an opposite direction: Equilibria are such that the maximum of
the Laer curve for the income tax is reached. I.e., instead of putting scal authorities on a
dietary regime, tax competition here feeds governments to obesity. However, all tax revenues go
to nance generous subsidies { leaving governments with zero budget surplusses in the end. Tax
competition thus installs a giant, government-administered redistribution scheme from workers
to capital owners.
What does this mean for the labour market? In this paper, we start from a situation with
unemployment, generated by too high a xed nominal wage rate. Subsidies to rms decrease
their labour cost (thus boasting labour demand), and income taxes subsidize leisure demand
(reducing household incentives to supply labour). Hence, the redistribution scheme initiated by
tax competition narrows the gap between labour supply and demand. As we will see, unemploy-
ment will completely disappear in an equilibrium. In so far, the middlemen-governments do a
good job (necessary caveats will be added soon).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the formal framework for a double-Bertrand
tax competition game. Section 3 analyses the Nash equilibrium of this game under the assump-
tion that rms are slightly myopic. The unique Nash equilibrium may involve industrial clus-
tering in one region, and its income tax rate is the maximizer of the income tax Laer curve.
Section 4 presents two variations of the model, assuming more farsighted rms. This triggers
serious existence problems for equilibria. If they exist, equilibria still are located in the peak
region of the Laer curve for the income tax. Section 5 relates the results presented here to
ndings of the literature and concludes.
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Hellwig (1991) and Allen/Santomero (1997) provide surveys of the theory of (nancial) intermediation.
3
2 The model
We consider a common market formed by a given and nite number of n > 1 (n 2 N) jurisdic-
tions, called regions. Within the common market, there is free mobility of all goods and factors
without any impediment. To focus purely on tax and subsidy competition we assume that all
regions are (ex ante) identical in any respect. Private agents (i.e., households and rms) do not
have any initial attachment to a certain region; their utility and prot functions are not location
specic.
There is a continuum of prot maximizing single-output rms. All rms have the same neoclas-
sical production function f(e; k), where e and k denote labour and capital input, respectively.
Both inputs are essential: f(0; k) = f(e; 0) = f(0; 0) = 0 for all e; k > 0. f satises the Inada
limit conditions. Furthermore we assume that
f
e
> 0; f
ee
< 0; f
k
> 0; f
kk
< 0; f
ek
> 0 and f
ee
f
kk
  (f
ek
)
2
 0:
Capital and labour have positive, but decreasing marginal returns and are complementary in-
puts. f is concave.
Firms have exogenous capital endowments (assets) . There are no other sources for outside
nance and hence a rm's capital input in production is equal to . We will identify  with the
size of the investment project which a rm with this endowment plans to undertake. We assume
that k is continuously distributed on an interval K := [; ] with 0 <  <  <1. By H() we
denote the distribution function of k. We assume that H is dierentiable and that H
0
() > 0
for all  2 K.
As capital input is already xed, rms only have to decide on their location and their labour
input. Locational choices depend on regional wage subsidies granted by regional governments.
These wage subsidies can be interpreted as premia given to rms per created job. If rm 
obtains a job subsidy s  0, its prots amount to
 = f(e; )  (w   s)  e; (1)
where w > 0 is the wage rate. w is exogenous and equal for all regions (see below).
Labour is endogenously supplied by households. There is a continuum of price-taking households
with linear preferences on the consumption-leisure space:
u(c; 1  `; ) = c+   (1  `)
where c and ` 2 [0; 1] denote consumption and labour supply, respectively.  is the constant
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and will be identied as the
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household's type. It is distributed on an interval  = [;

] where 0 <  <

. G() is the
dierentiable and atomless distribution function of . Households decide on their region of
residence and on their labour supply. From a household's viewpoint, regions dier in the job
opportunities they oer (see below) and the income taxes they levy. If a household earns the
gross wage w and is subject to a (regional) income tax t 2 [0; w), her net wage per hour of work
is c = w   t. Abusing standard taxonomy, we will often call t a tax rate. Clearly, the optimal
labour choice is of the bang-bang type with
`(t; ) =
(
1 i   w   t
0 else:
(2)
We assume that households can only work in their region of residence and, consequently, any
rm can only hire workers who actually live at its location (no commuting).
Each of the identical regions i = 1; : : : ; n is ruled by a government which aims at maximizing its
(expected) budget surplus.
3
Each regional government i uses as policy variables the regional in-
come tax t
i
and the regional job subsidy s
i
. Governments behave non-cooperatively. A strategy
of government i is a pair 
i
= (s
i
; t
i
). We write vectors in bold type (such as x = (x
1
; : : : x
n
)).
0 and 1 denote the n-dimensional vectors of zeros and ones, respectively.
We argued at the outset that subsidizing rms is especially attractive for governments when
there is unemployment. Moreover, we argued that the measure widely held appropriate by
politicians for the success of their policies is the number of new jobs created. Against this back-
ground it seems odd not to give employment any explicit weight in the governments' objective
functions, but rather to resort to the Leviathan hypothesis of budget surplus maximization.
Recall, however, that we may interpret governments as intermediaries in the labour market.
Such as ordinary salesmen seek to sell all their stocks and thus to balance purchases and sales,
so do middleman-governments have a genuine interest to bring all their residents to work. An
unemployed does not pay any wage taxes and thus is of no value for Leviathan governments.
One might regard this as a cynical attitude towards the unemployment problem, but it demon-
strates that the Leviathan assumption is not as unrelated to the employment issue as one might
prima facie suspect.
The timing of the game will be of crucial importance for the results. For the beginning, we
adopt the following sequence of moves:
1. Regional governments move rst by simultaneously deciding on their strategies 
i
= (s
i
; t
i
).
Their choices  are observed by the private agents.
3
There is no uncertainty in our model. However, at this point we must take provisions for random equilibrium
selection issues. Hence, the term "expected".
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2. Next, rms decide on their locations and announce the numbers of jobs they plan to create.
These announcements are binding commitments.
3. Households choose their regions of residence and make labour-consumption choices.
4. All decisions become eective: Taxes are collected, subsidies are paid out, and nal prot
and utility levels will be realized.
Governments are Stackelberg leaders with respect to the private agents, and play a Nash game
among themselves. All private agents are small price-takers. The game structure and all moves
are common knowledge. Since we consider randomized tax and subsidy schemes as unrealistic,
we only discuss pure strategies.
3 A Fiscal Game with Myopic Firms
We do not require that supply of and demand for labour balance on the regional (or the sys-
temwide) labour markets. Moreover, we explicitly allow for rationing, i.e., for involuntary un-
employment or job vacancies. This requires some assumptions on how private agents account
for possible disequilibria in the labour markets:
We invariably assume that households (who move last in all our games) take into account that
they can only be employed in a region where job oers are in sucient supply.
Firms, who are second to move after governments, can in principle anticipate the residential
choices and labour supply decisions of households. They could thus nd out whether all job
opportunities they oer have a chance to be lled with workers. In this section, however, we
analyse the game under the assumption that rms do not take into account that they may be
rationed; they behave as if it were certain that they can always hire as many workers as they
ideally want to. To partly justify this assumption (to be dropped in Section 4) note that without
government intervention there will be unemployment in the economy (see Assumption U below).
Hence, rms may see the case of too small a labour force simply as irrelevant.
3.1 Firms' Decisions
Firms and households make their choices in knowledge of the governments' strategies  = (s; t).
Since they do not care what households do, rms are only interested in the subsidy part s of .
Firms decide on their location and on their labour demand.
It is obvious from the prot function (1) that rms select their location among those regions
which oer the highest subsidy. Given a subsidy vector s, denote by s^ := max
k
fs
k
g and by
M(s) := fi js
i
= s^g the highest subsidy and the set of regions which oer this, respectively. We
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will call M(s) the set of industrialized regions because only regions in M attract businesses.
Suppose rm  decides to locate in region i, obtaining a job subsidy of s
i
. Then its labour
demand e(w   s
i
; ) is uniquely determined by the prot maximizing condition
f
e
(e; ) = w   s
i
:
Calculate that
@e(w   s
i
; )
@s
i
=  
1
f
ee
> 0 and
@e(w   s
i
; )
@k
=  
f
ek
f
ee
> 0: (3)
A rm's labour demand is the higher the larger is the job subsidy and the larger is its capital
endowment. Due to the simplicity of locational choices, total (systemwide) labour demand L
d
only depends on the maximal element s^ of a subsidy vector s:
L
d
(s^) :=
Z
K
e(w   s^; ) dH(): (4)
The distribution of rms across regions is irrelevant. Clearly, from (3)
dL
d
ds^
> 0:
W.r.t. the regional distribution of rms we assume that if several regions oer the same max-
imum subsidy s^, they each face an equal chance of attracting rms. Hence, with a vector s of
subsidies the expected amount of jobs created in region i is given by
L
i
d
(s) =
8
<
:
1
]M(s)
 L
d
(s^) if i 2M(s)
0 else,
(5)
where ] denotes the cardinality of a set. From a regional government's perspective, competition
for business investments is of the Bertrand, winner-take-all type: Firms can only be attracted
if the own subsidy is as least as high as any of the other regional subsidies.
3.2 Household Choices
When households choose their residence and labour supply, governments have already decided
on  and rms have already found their locations and announced their job openings. Given
, every household knows that he can only get a job in an industrialized region. Among these
regions, households prefer low-tax ones. If all households (or a representative sample of them)
faced the same tax rate t 2 [0; w], total labour supply (possibly adjusted by the sample size)
would by (2) amount to
L
s
(t) =
Z

`(t; ) dG() = G(w   t): (6)
Check that the function L
s
(t) cuts both axes in a tax rate/labour supply diagram:
L
s
(0) = G(w) > 0 = G() = L
s
(w   ):
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3.3 Regional Employment
We assume that if several regions in M(s) oer the same lowest income tax rate, households
arbitrarily choose one of these regions to apply for a job there. It may well happen that labour
demand is not sucient to cover labour supply at the smallest tax rate. Then the rejected
households turn to the industrialized region with the second (third, fourth, ...) lowest tax rate
where they apply with a labour supply correspondingly adjusted according to (6). We assume
that households always move in representative samples, i.e., each government faces the same
distribution G() of households. We can now calculate the number L
i
s
() of workers applying
for a job in region i, given governments' strategies :
 If i =2M(s), then labour supply is zero in this region, regardless of its tax rate.
 If region i is industrialized and sets a tax rate t
i
, the number of households applying for a
job in i is given by
L
i
s
() = max

0;
1
] fk 2M(s) jt
k
= t
i
g

G(w   t
i
)  ] fk 2M(s) jt
k
< t
i
g
L
d
(s^)
]M(s)

:
(7)
Equation (7) deserves some explanation: Any industrialized region oers L
d
(s^)=]M(s) jobs (see
(5)). Assume for a moment that all industrialized regions chose dierent tax rates and that
region i is the unique lowest-tax region among them: t
i
< t
k
for all k 2M(s) and k 6= i. By (6),
region i faces a labour supply of G(w   t
i
) which it can fully serve when labour is in sucient
demand there, i.e., if G(w   t
i
)  L
d
(s^)=]M(s). If, however, not all households willing to work
can get a job in i, i.e., if G(w   t
i
) > L
d
(s^)=]M(s), then the rejected households will move to
that industrialized region, say j, which has the next higher tax rate (i.e., where t
i
< t
j
< t
k
for
all k 6= i; j). At a tax rate t
j
total labour supply would be G(w t
j
). An amount of L
d
(s^)=]M(s)
workers has already been employed in region i, such that region j only faces an actual labour
supply of G(w  t
j
) L
d
(s^)=]M(s) if this is greater than zero and of zero else. If there are still
workers who are involuntarily unemployed, these households move to the region with the next
lowest tax rate where labour supply is determined in an analogous manner.
For the case that several regions set the same tax rate we assume that there will be an equal
split of labour supply amongst these regions. This is expressed by the fraction in front of the
square brackets in equation (7).
In a natural way, employment E
i
() in region i is dened as the minimum of regional labour
supply (7) and labour demand (5):
E
i
() = min

L
i
d
(s); L
i
s
()
	
: (8)
To have an interesting problem we make the following
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Assumption U : L
d
(0) < L
s
(0).
Assumption U says that without government intervention (i.e., with  = (0;0)), total labour
supply exceeds total labour demand: There is systemwide unemployment. Since with identical
strategies in all regions rms and households distribute equally across the economy, we have
unemployment in every region when all governments are passive:
E
i
(0;0) = L
i
d
(0) = L
d
(0)=n < L
s
(0)=n = L
i
s
(0;0)
for all i. Assumption U can equivalently be written as:
R
K
e(w; ) dH() < G(w), stating that
the exogenous and constant (gross) wage rate w is too high to clear the labour market. A story
fabricated to motivate Assumption U may go as follows: The systemwide wage rate w has been
xed outside the model by trade unions and employer lobbys in wage negotiations.
4
These agents
have agreed upon a wage rate above the market clearing level (which is not too unrealistic). As
a consequence, there is unemployment in a "laissez-faire" regime. Regional governments observe
this and try to promote employment conditions in their jurisdictions by attracting businesses.
Since both L
s
and L
d
are continuous, L
s
(t) cuts both axes, and L
d
(s) is strictly increasing in s,
we get the following obvious, but still helpful lemma:
Lemma 1 Under Assumption U , there exists a unique  2]0; w   [ such that:
L
s
() = L
d
(): (9)
The number  introduced in Lemma 1 has the following property: If rms are subsidized at rate
 per job and simultaneously workers are taxed at the same rate , then total labour supply
and total labour demand will balance. Hence, w    is the competitive (Walrasian) price of
labour.
3.4 Governments' Payos
Governments are assumed to maximize their budget surplusses, i.e. the dierences between
tax revenues and subsidies. Given a strategy vector , the budget surplus B
i
of government i
amounts to
B
i
() := t
i
 E
i
()  s
i
 L
i
d
(s); (10)
where E
i
and L
i
d
are given by (8) and (7). Note in (10) that governments pay subsidies for every
workplace created in their jurisdictions (i.e., for L
i
d
), not only for those actually employed (E
i
).
4
Centralized wage bargaining is not uncommon even in federal economies (cf. e.g. Germany). Usually, however,
wage negotiations are assumed to go about net wages which already incorporate tax eects. In our story, the tax
system is determined after gross wages.
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Since with identical policies of all regions rms and households distribute equally across regions,
all budgets balance if all governments choose t
i
= s
i
= :
B
i
(  (1;1)) =  E
i
(  (1;1))     L
i
d
(  1)
=  
L
s
()
n
   
L
d
()
n
= 0:
3.5 The Nash Equilibrium
Our double Bertrand tax competition game has been crafted such as to exhibit the same struc-
ture as a competition between prot maximizing intermediaries on goods or nancial markets.
Recently, Yanelle (1996) examined the features of double Bertrand competition between in-
termediaries. Her main result (Proposition 2.2) applies immediately to our scenario:
Result 1 The tax competition game has a symmetric and (up to a permutation of regions)
unique Nash equilibrium 

= (s

 1; t

 1). In this equilibrium all governments choose a tax
rate
t

= argmax
t
t  L
s
(t): (11)
Furthermore, all governments choose the subsidy s

such that
t

 L
s
(t

) = s

 L
d
(s

): (12)
If t

6= , then in an equilibrium all rms locate in the same region.
Proof: We essentially follow Yanelle (1996, pp. 15f).
1. 

is an equilibrium:
Suppose, all governments j 6= i have chosen t
j
= t

and s
j
= s

. Government i's con-
siderations concerning a best reply are the following: With s
i
< s

no rm would settle
in region i. With s
i
> s

government i would attract all rms, but its subsidy payments
would be greater than the maximum amount of income taxes it could ever raise:
s
i
 L
d
(s
i
) > s

 L
d
(s

) = t

 L
s
(t

) = max
t
t  L
s
(t)
if s
i
> s

(since L
d
(s^) strictly increases in s^). Hence, B
i
< 0. Therefore, s
i
= s

is the
best choice. Given s

, however, it is optimal to set t
i
= t

, for government i would face
B
i
< 0 with any other tax rate.
2. 

is the unique equilibrium:
Suppose there were another equilibrium
~
 = (~s 1;
~
t 1) 6= 

(due to the symmetry of the
model, only symmetric equilibria have to be considered).
10
(i) If ~s > s

, then governments' expenditures would exceed the maximum earnings pos-
sible: B
i
< 0 for all i. This cannot be an equilibrium.
(ii) If ~s < s

and
~
t = t

, then any government i could increase its budget surplus by
choosing s
i
= ~s +  < s

. It would attract all rms, consequently all workers, and
earn a strictly higher surplus than with
~
:
B
i
 
(~s+ ; t

); (~s; t

)  (1)
n 1

= t

 L
s
(t

)  (~s+ )  L
d
(~s+ )
>
1
n
 [t

 L
s
(t

)  ~s  L
d
(~s)]
for  > 0, but small enough.
(iii) If ~s < s

and
~
t < t

, then any government i could increase its budget surplus by
increasing both t
i
and s
i
. E.g., let 
i
= (~s+ ; t

). Then
B
i
 

i
; (~s; t

)  (1)
n 1

= t

 L
s
(t

)  (~s+ )  L
d
(~s+ )
>
1
n


~
t  L
s
(
~
t)  ~s  L
d
(~s)

for  > 0 small enough.
(iv) If ~s < s

and
~
t > t

, then any government i could increase its budget surplus by
increasing s
i
and lowering t
i
. E.g., let 
i
= (~s+ 
1
;
~
t  
2
). Then
B
i
 

i
; (~s;
~
t)  (1)
n 1

= (
~
t  
2
)  L
s
(
~
t  
2
)  (~s+ 
1
)  L
d
(~s+ 
1
)
>
1
n


~
t  L
s
(
~
t)  ~s  L
d
(~s)

for 
1
; 
2
> 0 small enough.
3. If t

6= , then in the equilibrium all rms locate in the same region:
Suppose that governments have chosen 

and that there are rms in more than one
region. Recall that B
i
(

) = 0 for all i. Now, each of the industrialized regions has an
incentive to choose 
i
= (s

; t

  ). With this deviation we get B
i
> 0 because the full
job capacity created in region i can be employed (recall that we have full employment or
overcapacities with 

). Q.E.D.
Result 1 has several immediate implications:
Corollary: In the Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game:
1. all regional budgets balance;
2. t

=  if and only if  is the revenue maximizing rate of the income tax;
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3. if t

6= , total and regional labour demands exceeds total and, resp., labour supplies:
L
d
(s

) > L
s
(t

) and L
i
d
(s

 1) > L
i
s
(

);
4. if t

= , the systemwide labour market and all regional labour markets clear: L
d
(s

) =
L
s
(t

) and L
i
d
(s

 1) = L
i
s
(

) for all i = 1; : : : ; n;
5. neither t

nor s

are ever smaller than .
For a better understanding, it may be helpful to write Result 1 in a dierent form. Let
^
t := argmax
t0
(t  L
s
(t))
be the unconstraint maximizer of the Laer curve for the income tax. Note that
^
t may dier
from t

as dened in (11). There are two possible equilibrium congurations:
 If
^
t  , then t

i
= s

i
=  for all i.
 If
^
t > , then t

i
=
^
t and s

i
= s^ for all i, where s^ solves
^
t  L
s
(
^
t) = s  L
d
(s).
These two congurations are depicted in Figure 1 and 2, respectively, where we chose labour
demand and supply functions to be linear for simplicity.
5
Figures 1 and 2 go here
All regional governments choose their income tax rate t such as to maximize attainable tax
revenues from labour. This maximum need not coincide with the unconstraint maximum of the
income tax Laer curve, which is reached at the tax rate
^
t. Using the denition of , we can
rewrite (11) to obtain
t

= argmax
x
fx minfL
s
(x); L
d
(x)gg ; (13)
which exhibits that governments tax employable (as contrasted to supplied) labour to the highest
degree possible.
The original version of Result 1 in Yanelle (1996) is used to demonstrate that the gure of the
Walrasian auctioneer who operates the market processing in competitive equilibrium theory
cannot always be replaced by intermediaries who engage in a Bertrand-game (also see Yanelle
1997). This interpretation carries over to the application of Yanelle's result here (see below).
Moreover, Result 1 oers a bunch of new interpretations in the scal competition context:
5
Strictly speaking, the curves t L
s
and s L
d
in the gures are labelled incorrectly. The graphs actually depict
the inverse mappings of these functions. Being precise in that respect would, however, require more notation
without noticeably adding to clarity.
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 Result 1 says that in the Nash equilibrium of a scal game between middleman-govern-
ments the feasible budget size is maximized: Leviathans grow fat to their maximum height.
It seems to be a stylized fact that the size of real-world governments (measured, e.g.,
by government spending as a percentage of GDP) is ever growing. Once celebrated in
Wagner's Law as evidence for social progress, this upward trend has since long become a
matter of serious concern in most industrialized countries. Globalization, deeper economic
integration, and tax competition are commonly thought to be powerful devices to tame
scal hunger. However, this intuition has so far hardly any support from reality: Although
in the 1980s and 1990s the breeze of globalization has become a strong wind, government
sizes are still going up. Our model may oer an explanation for this conundrum. With free
factor ows, governments may be pushed into the role of intermediary salesmen. Result 1
then says that scal competition makes governments grow as fat as possible.
 According to (12), equilibrium job subsidies are adapted such as to balance governments'
budgets. While the budget size is maximal, all revenues are spent, leaving governments
with nothing to use for their own purposes. The tax competition equilibrium thus involves
the most massive transfers from workers to rms. Workers are "exploited" to the greatest
possible extent, and, as all of this money goes to rms, subsidies reach their highest
aordable level, too. "Exploitation" should not be taken literally, since, by assumption U ,
net incomes w of the initial situation are too high relative to the competitive wage level.
Tax competition corrects for this deterioration from the equilibrium. We have already
pointed out that a major cause for high unemployment in the real world is too high labour
cost. In a sense, tax competition brings about a government-nanced cut in labour cost
which in an equilibrium amount to w   s

.
6
In order to enable governments to nance
the cuts, income taxes have to be increased from zero to t

. This is reminding of a tax
incidence hypothesis for the labour market model, suggested e.g. by Tyrv

ainen (1995),
that the non-wage cost of labour (the tax wedge) is half borne by wage-earners (reducing
labour supply) and half by rms (lowering labour demand).
 Recall that  can be interpreted as the competitive level of taxes or subsidies (since the
labour market clears at a net wage of w ). According to item 5 in the Corollary, tax rates
and subsidies are never lower than . Often they are higher (namely, if  hence lies in the
increasing part of the Laer curve for the income tax). I.e., compared to the competitive
level, workers are taxed too heavily whereas rms are subsidized too generously. This
sounds identical to an important observation of the "standard" tax competition literature
(e.g., Bucovetsky/Wilson 1990). However, the analogy is misleading. In the standard
6
Cf. Pissarides (1998) for a critical assessment of the proposal to combat high unemployment by cutting
labour cost.
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models capital is mobile and labour immobile. Furthermore, the benchmarks are dierent:
Here it is a labour market equilibrium, there it is the benet principle of taxation.
 The industrialized region(s) may face overcapacities in the equilibrium: If  is in the
increasing part of the income tax Laer curve, then there will be job vacancies in the
equilibrium (L
d
> L
s
). Otherwise, full employment will emerge. Hence, middlemen-
governments often "buy" too many jobs. Starting from a situation with unemployment
(cf. Assumption 1), scal competition among Leviathans may lead to an oversupply of job
opportunities.
This result is certainly odd seen against reality which has unemployment galore. In our
model, it is due to the myopic behaviour of rms which, spurred by vast subsidies, "create"
jobs without checking whether these can be employed. One might also blame governments
for being reponsible for the oddity of overcapacities. They subsidize workplaces, not job
matches. Put dierently, employed workers do not only (partially) nance their own jobs,
but also some vacancies. We will address to this issue in Section 4.
 In the Nash equilibrium, there may be an extreme industrial concentration: Firms and
consequently workers all settle in one region. Surprisingly, this result emerges without
imposing any spatial structure on the model. Especially, there are no agglomeration ad-
vantages or disadvantages which may explain the result. The locational structure is pure
chance: the region where the industry clusters is chosen randomly (with equal probability
for all regions). In its spirit (but not in its origins), the clustering result here is reminiscent
of a similar result in Arthur (1990) who explains locational patterns in economies as the
eventual outcomes emerging from some historical processes. In his Theorem 1, Arthur
(1990) shows that an extreme spatial concentration may occur in an economy under free
mobility of rms with identical behavioural patterns, but without any advantages or dis-
advantages of agglomeration. Clustering simply reects homogeneity of the rms' needs
for workers. The similarity in the two models lies in the observation that (dis-)economies
of agglomeration or a specic spatial structure in an economy are not essential in order to
explain dense industrial concentrations.
4 Two Alternative Scenarios
4.1 Firms Care about Rationing
Apart from the clustering of rms in a single region, an oddity of the Nash equilibrium in
Result 1 is that rms may be indiced to oer more jobs than can actually be empoyed. The
basic reason for this peculiarity is the myopic behaviour of rms which can most easily be seen
from the prot function (1). There no distinction between announced and actual employment is
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made. Firms thus behave as if they were to pay wages for and produce with workers they in fact
do not (and cannot) hire. In this section we drop this assumption and turn to a more rational
rm behaviour. We modify stages 2 and 4 of the game as follows:
1 . : : :
2'. Firms make a locational choice for one region i and an announcement to create a certain
number of jobs there.
3 . : : :
4'. All decisions become eective: Actual employment decisions are made, taxes are collected,
subsidies are paid out, and nal prot and utility levels will be realized.
Firms can only announce jobs in the region where they settle. Announcement are binding com-
mitments in so far as rms must not install fewer workplaces than announced except for the
case that labour supply in the region is too small to nd enough sta. As before, subsidies are
paid per announced job, whether vacant or not (Governments still are nave).
We now must distinguish between the announced and the actual value of a variable. Announced
variables will wear a tilde. Let ~e(i;; ) be the number of jobs a type- rm announces to create
in region i when governments choose  as their tax-and-subsidy policies. Clearly, if a rm does
not locate in i, its labour demand in that region is zero. Unlike labour demand e in the previous
section, the variable ~e does not only depend on the highest subsidy, but on the whole strategy
vector . Dene
~
L
i
d
() :=
Z
K
~e(i;; ) dH()
as total announced labour demand in region i and denote by
~
M() :=
n
i



~
L
i
d
() > 0
o
the set of potentially industrialized regions, i.e., the set of regions where rms plan to install
workbenches.
Next check that households are not aected by the change in the rules of the game. They can
still only apply for a job in a potentially industrialized region. Rationing of the rms is irrelevant
for them. Households can treat announced jobs as if they were actually created. Hence, neither
their migration nor their labour supply decisions dier from those in Section 3. Eqs. (6) and (7)
remain valid if we replace L
d
(s) by
~
L
i
d
() and M(s^) by
~
M() in (7):
L
i
s
() = max
8
<
:
0;
1
]
n
k 2
~
M() jt
k
= t
i
o

2
4
G(w   t
i
) 
X
k2
~
M()with t
k
<t
i
~
L
k
d
()
3
5
9
=
;
: (14)
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As by assumption rms never hire more workers than they announce, actual employment E
i
coincides with eective labour demand L
i
d
, which never exceeds the smaller of announced job
capacities and labour supply:
E
i
()  L
i
d
() = minf
~
L
i
d
(); L
i
s
()g: (15)
Regional governments collect taxes per unit of labour employed and spend subsidies per job
announcement. The budget surplus of government i is given by:
B
i
() = t
i
 E
i
()  s
i

~
L
i
d
(): (16)
We assume that, if rationing ocurs in region i, then it hits all rms in that region in equal
proportions. Hence, if it announces to create a number of ~e() jobs in i, then a rm will actually
employ a number of
e() = min
(
1;
L
s
i
()
~
L
d
i
()
)
 ~e() (17)
workers. Hence, rm 's prots when it locates in region i amount to:
 = f(e; )  w  e+ s
i
 ~e
= f(e; ) 
"
w   s
i
max
(
1;
~
L
i
d
()
L
i
s
()
)#
 e;
where we used (17). Unlike in the previous scenario, rms do not necessarily locate in the region
with the highest subsidy. Rather than being rationed a rm may prefer a less generous region
without rationing. Firms also have to take into account the tax rates t, not only the subsidy
part of . The relevant parameter is the eective subsidy rate
~s
i
:= s
i
max
(
1;
~
L
i
d
()
L
i
s
()
)
which is higher than the statutory one if rationing occurs in region i. (Recall that subsidies are
paid per job opening, not per hiring contract.) The set of potentially industrialized regions is
then:
~
M() = fi j~s
i
 s
k
for all kg :
Next we need an assumption about how rms infer the eective subsidies ~s
i
from the observed
governmental strategies . In doing so they must anticipate households' decisions and the other
rms' behaviour. To keep matters simple, we assume that all rms ignore their inuence on
all ~s
i
(which in fact is marginal) and that their forecasting methods are identical. Given , all
rms thus unanimously foresee the same vector of ~s
i
. Somehow vaguely, these calculations shall
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be based on the assumption that all agents behave rationally in the pursuit of their objectives.
Especially { and this is indeed the only conjectural assumption we need {, if the strategy vector
chosen by the governments does not necessitate any rationing, then rms should not expect
rationing to happen. In that case, they will behave as outlined in Section 3.
We are again interested in the Nash equilibria of the subsidy-and-tax competition game among
regional governments. The problem now is a bit uglier. As a rst step, we show
Lemma 2 In a Nash equilibrium 

, labour supply in all potentially industrialized regions does
not exceed announced job capacities, i.e.:
i 2
~
M(

) =) L
i
s
(

) 
~
L
i
d
(

): (18)
The proof of Lemma 2 is relegated to the Appendix. Lemma 2 has a series of important
consequences:
1. In a Nash equilibrium 

, all industrialized regions levy the same tax rate:
t

i
= t

for all i 2
~
M(

):
Proof: From Lemma 2, there is never oversupply of labour in any industrialized region
and thus economywide. If a region levies a tax rate higher than the minimum tax rate of
all other regions, than it will not attract any labour and thus will run a budget decit.
Hence, from (14), we get that in an equilibrium
L
i
s
(

) =
G(w   t

)
]
~
M(

)
for all i 2
~
M(

):
2. In a Nash equilibrium 

, total labour demand equals total announced labour demand:
G(w   t

) =
X
i
~
L
i
d
(

):
Proof: From Lemma 2, total labour demand cannot exceed announced labour supply
in an equilibrium. Now suppose that it were strictly smaller. Then at least one region
pays subsidies for job announcements which remain vacant. By slightly lowering its tax
rate, this region could attract and employ more workers, and thus raise higher revenues
at constant expenditures.
7
3. Consequently, in a Nash equilibrium, announced labour demand and labour supply coincide
in every region:
~
L
i
d
(

) = L
i
s
(

) for all i: (19)
This in turn implies:
7
Note that this argument also applies when all rms cluster in a single region (which, from Result 1, cannot
be excluded).
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 As there is no rationing, in a Nash equilibrium announced and eective labour demand
will coincide for every rm:
~
L
i
d
(

) = L
i
s
(

) ) e(i;

; ) = ~e(i;

; ) for all rms :
 In a Nash equilibrium, ~s

i
= s

i
. Consequently, all potentially industrialized regions
must oer the same subsidy:
s

i
= s

j
= s

for all i; j 2
~
M(

):
 The Nash equilibrium budget surplus of every region i 2
~
M amounts to
B
i
= (t

  s

) G(w   t

):
4. As a consequence, in a Nash equilibrium there is no rationing in any region:
~
L
i
d
(

) = L
i
d
(

) = L
i
s
(

) for all i:
Recall the assumption that, if the strategy vector  does not necessitate any rationing, then
rms will behave such as in Section 3. We so far have shown that in a Nash equilibrium rationing
cannot occur, but that the labour market will clear. Hence, the only candidate vector for a Nash
equilibrium is the "Walrasian" vector 

=   (1;1). From Result 1 we know, however, that
  (1;1) can only be a Nash equilibrium if  is at the same time a revenue maximizing tax rate.
This observation carries over to the present scenario:
Result 2 Let L
d
(s) and L
s
(t) be as originally dened in (4) and (6) and be  such that L
s
() =
L
d
(). If
 = argmax
x
fx minfL
s
(x); L
d
(x)gg ; (20)
then the tax competition game possesses a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium which is given
by


=   (1;1):
Otherwise, no Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof: Under condition (20) the Nash equilibrium derived in Result 1 does not imply rationing,
but has clearing labour markets. Hence, it is also an equilibrium of the modied game. If
condition (20) does not hold, the Nash equilibrium of Result 1 involves rationing. Now suppose
that   (1;1) is a Nash equilibrium. Then there exists
^
t 6=  such that
^
t  L
s
(
^
t) >   L
s
() =   L
d
():
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Let government j choose s
j
= +  <
^
t = t
j
. Since with this strategy rms do not expect to be
rationed in region j, the budget surplus of government j amounts to:
B
j
=
^
t G(w  
^
t)  (+ )  L
d
(+ ) > 0;
which is a protable deviation from the zero-surplus situation (; ). Q.E.D.
Condition (20) requires the labour market clearing tax rate to be a revenue maximizing one. If
condition (20) holds, then a unique Nash equilibrium exists which is symmetric, entails clear-
ing regional and systemwide labour markets and puts governments on top of the Laer curve
for the "employment tax". This equilibrium does not dier from the one depicted in Figure 1
above (compare (20) and (13), which describes the Nash equilibrium tax rate in the setting of
Section 3). If condition (20) does not hold, then no Nash equilibrium exists.
Yanelle (1996) analyses Bertrand competition among intermediaries who, in addition to the
usual buying and selling prices can also choose capacities they maximally will buy from sellers.
A Nash equilibrium then only exists if the competitive price in the market is also a revenue
maximizing one. In this case, buying and selling at the Walrasian price and creating capac-
ities equal to the trade volume at this price is the equilibrium strategy (Propositions 3.1 and
3.2 in Yanelle 1996). Result 2 above is in the same spirit: By xing tax rates and subsidy
levels, regional governments induce rms to make job announcements that can be interpreted
as capacities. In a Nash equilibrium the piling up of over-capacities cannot occur, i.e., no region
would let rms announce a greater number of subsidized jobs than can later be occupied (cf.
(19)). However, such an equilibrium may fail to exist.
For interpretations and implications of Result 2 we refer to our discussion of Result 1. Note,
however, that a Nash equilibrium in the actual scenario cannot lead to industrial clustering in
one region. For the cases where Result 1 predicts such an extreme pattern, Result 2 states the
non-existence of an equilibrium. Hence, if a Nash equilibrium exists in the actual scenario, rms
and workers distribute equally across the regional system.
4.2 Governments Move Twice
We briey consider a second modication of the original game. In the previous section we
made a distinction between announced and actual numbers of workplaces, thus rendering rms'
reasoning "more rational". Here, we adopt a dierent sequence of moves: First, regional govern-
ments non-cooperatively x their subsidies s. Second, rms make their locational choices and
thus reveal how much jobs they want to open. Third, governments non-cooperatively set income
tax rates t. Finally, households decide on their residences and employers. When it comes to
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choosing tax rates, regional goverments already know their budgetary needs: In the rst stage
they have committed to a "buying price" for jobs created in their jurisdiction, and in the second
one rms have imposed the corresponding quantitites. Obviously, we have a two-stage game
among governments. We therefore look for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
Formally, the setting just described is identical to that in Stahl (1988). Two main results of
Stahl's approach on winner-take-all competition among merchants can thus readily be trans-
ferred to the interregional framework presented here:
8
Result 3 (Stahl (1988)) Let L
d
(s) and L
s
(t) be as originally dened in (4) and (6) and be
 such that L
s
() = L
d
(). If
 = argmax
x
fx minfL
s
(x); L
d
(x)gg ; (21)
then the tax competition game possesses a unique and symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium which is given by


=   (1;1):
Otherwise, no subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium exists.
The proof is a straightforward adaptation of the proofs for Propositions 1 and 2 in Stahl (1988).
The reader may feel to encounter a deja-vue when coming across Result 3: Apart from the
tiny "subgame-perfect" added, Result 3 coincides with Result 2. Consequently, in case it exists
an equilibrium is such as in Figure 1, part a) and has the properties and implications already
discussed in Section 3.
The alternative scenarios discussed in this section reveal that severe existence problems for Nash
equilibria can be expected in Bertrand tax competition. This is in line with results obtained
by Schulze/Koch (1994) and Koch/Schulze (1998) for one-sided Bertrand tax competition.
There, existence problems are due to asymmetries or to the availability of "outside options" for
taxation. In the double-Bertrand setting discussed here, neither of these assumptions is needed
to trigger non-existence.
If an equilibrium exists in either of the two scenarios discussed in this section, then it involves full
employment. This is reminiscent of a result obtained byGabszewicz/van Ypersele (1996) for
a scal game where the strategic variable of governments is the minimum wage. In this model,
if there is too high a wage rate in a region, mobile capital will ee the region and thereby trigger
8
Note that these results (especially the non-existence part) crucially hinge upon the tie-breaking rule which {
in our context { says that with equal tax rates all industrialized regions share labour supply equally.
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unemployment. Therefore the minimum wage rate will (often) be set on the (low) competitive
level, although the policy makers' preferences are strongly biased towards workers' interests. In
the model presented here, where regional governments in fact also determine the wage rate, the
competitive level will emerge, too. Although the mechanisms here and in Gabszewicz/van
Ypersele (1996) are quite diverse, they share a common message: Fiscal competition drives
labour markets towards the equilibrium, which, for employed workers, comes at the price of a
lower wage rate.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We set up a model of a tax competition game where governments choose their tax-and-subsidy
strategies as to corner both sides of a distorted labour market. It seems worthwile to compare the
ndings reported here to those emerging from the more standard tax competition literature which
usually assumes that there exists at least one immobile item in the economy. AsKoch/Schulze
(1998) point out, the core model of tax competition uses (among other ingredients) capital as a
generically mobile factor, whereas all other factors cannot cross regional borders. Even in richer
models with several mobile items (such as Burbidge/Myers 1994) there is one immobile tax
issue (plausibly enough, land is often chosen for this role). Only few authors examine the
case of both capital and labour mobility, albeit with imperfect household mobility (see, e.g.,
Mansoorian/Myers 1993, 1997, or Eggert 1995). In all these models, regional governments
optimize an objective function related to the utility of the owners of the immobile factors. The
main message says that the Nash equilibria of such games are inecient: Free mobility of capital
imposes an arbitrage condition upon the economy and thus gives o-spring to interregional
externalities that are ignored by self-concerned regional governments. The approach taken here
diers from the standard model in several respects:
 Goverments in our model aim at maximizing their budget surplusses rather than regional
welfare. This Leviathan assumption is not uncommon in the literature, but most of
these models (e.g., Kanbur/Keen 1993, Schulze/Koch 1994, Koch/Schulze 1998 or
Janeba/Peters 1999) incorporate only one (namely the revenue) side of the government
budget and thus implicitly assume that expenditures are xed. Moreover, governments in
these models can resort to an (elastic or inelastic) "inside option" for taxation and thus
do not entirely depend on mobile tax bases to cover their (unmodeled) scal needs. Sinn
(1992) discusses the taming eects of tax competition on Leviathans in a constitutional
framework (however, the model is not fully specied). In Edwards/Keen (1996) gov-
ernment objectives encompass pure Leviathan behaviour as a special case. Revenues from
taxes on mobile capital can be used to nance either local public goods, which benet
local citizens, or socially wasteful activities, which benet only the policy maker. Ed-
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wards/Keen (1996) nd that a policy coordination among regional governments may be
harmful to the utility of a representative citizen which happens if and only if the elasticity
of the tax base falls below Leviathan's marginal propensity to engage in wasteful activ-
ities. This indicates that for tax competition coming close to the Bertrand-type policy
coordination is always benecial, as (in an equilibrium) the tax base reacts innitly elastic
with respect to marginal tax changes.
 Unlike in great parts of the scal federalism literature, there are no immobile items in our
model (except for the ever-lasting goverments). Let us briey consider what would happen
if either households or rms were immobile:
1. If each region is inhabited by a suciently large number of households, luring an
investor into the region will create a marginal budget surplus of

t   s
i
per job. For
simplicity, let

t be a uniform tax rate in all regions. Firms still locate where regional
subsidies s
i
are highest. Consequently, a race between governments towards higher
subsidies will start. In the end subsidies are as high as to eat up the whole marginal
surplus: s

i
=

t for all regions.
2. Now assume that rms are irreversibly established and have installed workbenches in
sucient supply (assume an equal distribution across regions). If mobile households
can be attracted to work at these workbenches by low tax rates, then governments
engage in a tax cutting race and the zero tax rate is the unique Nash equilibrium of
such a game. If no budget decit is allowed, this requires zero job subsidies as well.
In any case governments end up with a zero budget surplus { such as in the present paper.
All these balanced budgets are, however, reached by quite dierent tax-subsidy mixes. The
interesting element in our observations is that governments choose tax rates as to climb on
top of the Laer curve, and spend all funds to footloose rms. A simple intuition runs as
follows: Attracting suciently many rms by high subsidies is prerequisite for governments
to earn suciently high revenues from the income tax. As a consequence, the demand side
of the labour market can fully exploit the supply side. Of course, this is an implication of
the order of moves in our game: rms move before households. An interesting suggestion
for further research would be to reverse the order of moves. Intuition tells us that if
households settle before rms choose their locations, this will lead to either a Walrasian
outcome or to a zero tax-and-subsidy equilibrium { thus perpetuating unemployment. One
might certainly question the assumption of perfect mobility of both rms and workers on
the grounds of reality. Somehow surprisingly, empirical evidence for tax-induced migration
responses seems to be more clearcut for labour than for capital. Meanwhile, however,
improved statistical analysis nds that both factors do in fact migrate to tax-favoured
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locations (see Inman/Rubinfeld 1996 or Hines 1996 for details and further references).
Hence, the mobility assumption adopted here is certainly extreme, but not totally far-
fetched.
 All regions in our model are identical. Hence, it does not come as a surprise when all
equilibria are symmetric. Similarly, if regions diered in size, preferences, or resource
endowments, equilibria of a tax competition games would reect these dierences (see
e.g. Haufler/Wooton 1999 or Huizinga/Nielsen 1997). However, recent empirical
ndings seem to support a convergence hypothesis for tax rates in the EU { albeit on a
high overall level of taxation (see e.g. Chennells/Griffith 1997). Tanzi/Zee (1998)
report that in 1997 the tax rates on individual incomes (which correspond to the t
i
of our
model) in the EU averaged at rather high 47.5%, but exhibited a rather small coecient
of variation of 18.7%, which is only a third of that among the 50 states of the U.S. They
interpret their observation as some sort of "decentralized harmonization", working through
economic integration and factor mobility in the EU. In principle, the present model, which
predicts high and equal income tax rates in a tax competition game may theoretically
underpin such an interpretation. However, since data on the non-wage cost of labour {
which would correspond to (the negative of) the s
i
in our model { are not available, and
furthermore our model lacks a lot of reality's features, we refrain from drawing too many
parallels to European reality.
Finally recall the main idea of this paper: Governments in an integrated economic framework
operate as middlemen. They use their contestable tax monopoly for correcting for possible
distortions which hinder markets from fully revealing their allocative prowess. Who thinks this
an overly optimistic view, will see selsh, merchant governments as "selling the state away" in
bidding wars and tax competition. Anyway, huge, Leviathan-like governments are not necessarily
doomed to extinction in the ongoing process of globalization and integration; governments of
that type may even grow to obesity.
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose the contrary of the assertion. I.e., there exists j with strategy (s

j
; t

j
) such that
~
L
j
d
(

) >
0 and L
j
s
(

) >
~
L
j
d
(

) = E
j
(

).
First verify that then in all regions k 2
~
M(

) with t

k
 t

j
we must have
L
k
s
(

) >
~
L
k
d
(

); (22)
too. Now consider a marginal increase of region j's tax rate from t

j
to t

j
+  and analyse what
happens to L
j
s
as given by (14). Two cases have to be distinguished:
 There is no k 6= j such that t

k
= t

j
. Then:
L
j
s
(

) = G(w   t

j
) 
X
h2
~
M(

)with t

h
<t

j
~
L
h
d
(

):
By a marginal increase in t

j
the sum term in this expression does not change (especially
check that no rm will change its behaviour). Only will the value of G change, but, due
to continuity, marginally. I.e.,  > 0 can be chosen such that L
j
s
still exceeds
~
L
j
d
.
 There exists k 2
~
M(

) other than j such that t

k
= t

j
. Let q be the number of such
regions. Then:
L
j
s
(

) = L
k
s
(

) =
1
q


G(w   t

j
) A
	
:
where we dened
A :=
X
h2
~
M(

)with t

h
<t

j
~
L
h
d
(

)
By an increase in t

j
this becomes:
L
j
s
() = G(w   t

j
  ) A 
X
k 6=j;k2
~
M(

)with t

k
=t

j
~
L
k
d
(

)
> G(w   t

j
  ) A  (q   1)  L
k
s
(

)
= G(w   t

j
  ) A 
q   1
q

 
G(w   t

j
) A

>
1
q

 
G(w   t

j
) A

= L
j
s
(

) >
~
L
j
d
(

):
The rst of these inequalities follows from (22), the second holds for  small enough due
to the continuity of G, and the third one holds by assumption.
Hence, by an appropriate increase in t

j
, government j would not aect its tax base. Employment
in region j is still E
j
=
~
L
j
s
. However, as the tax rate is higher, so are revenues. Hence, 

cannot
be an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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